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Agencies and the Arts: The Dilemma of Subsidizing
Expression
By Jennifer Weatherup*
This so-called piece of art is a deplorable, despicable display of
vulgarity .... This is an outrage, and our people's tax dollars
should not support this trash, and we should not be giving it the
dignity. I
[T]he Arts Endowment has another unique strength to
bring to the area of advocacy - the hard won wisdom
of having survived the culture wars as a public
agency. No major cultural institution in America was
subject to more prolonged and exacting criticism -
from both right and left - than the NEA. No agency
survives such a process without gaining clarity about
its mission and its methods, its constituency and its
challenges. 2
I. ISSUES RAISED IN THE ARTS REGULATION CONTEXT
"Art" is an innately ambiguous concept, and evaluations of
artwork inevitably involve a degree of subjective judgment. Not only
is art difficult to classify, but it may also spark controversy. Many
artists seek to push the envelope with their work, calling social norms
and conventions into question and often offending communities.
* The author is a graduate of Bryn Mawr College and is currently completing
her final year at Pepperdine Law School. She would like to thank Professor Ogden,
the editorial staff of the Journal of the NAALJ, and her family for their support.
1. 135 Cong. Rec. S5594-01 (daily ed. May 18, 1989) (statement of Sen.
D'Amato). Alfonse D'Amato's statement appears on a photograph by Andres
Serrano.
2. Dana Gioia, Chairman of the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA), Can
the National Endowment for the Arts Matter?, Speech before the National Press
Club in Washington D.C. (Jun. 30, 2003), available at
http://www.nea.gov/news/news03/PressClubSpeech.html.
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Nonetheless, while particular works of art may be decried, the arts as
a field are often embraced, and artistic works are often considered
central to the character of a community or nation. The artistic
impulse has long been considered a humanistic ideal which can
enrich the lives of artists and art lovers alike, as "the arts have the
ability to touch and move the soul, and can impress all kinds of
beauty upon it."
3
Our government has affirmed the value of art, providing financial
support for artists and arts programs through agencies such as the
National Endowment for the Arts (NEA). However, any sort of arts
regulation program will raise some inherent conflicts between
opposing ideals and concerns regarding governmental funding of
artistic expression. First of all, art by its very nature defies
regulation, making it difficult for an agency to adhere to a set of
standards without making an arbitrary judgment about what art is
acceptable. Likewise, the potential for art to offend or challenge the
public may become even greater when it is the general public that
must pay for "offensive" artwork,4 leading taxpayers and their
representatives to put political pressure on the agency to reform. If
art is intended to be subversive to some extent, it is inevitable that
controversial art will occasionally spark "a breakdown in relations
among the actors: the taxpaying consumers of the arts, the subsidized
artists, and the largess-dispensing agency." 5
As funding decisions are being made by the United States
government, the question of arts funding implicates the Constitution.
Unlike a private patron, the government must consider whether a
particular funding program is likely to infringe upon the First and
3. Jacques Nicholas Paillot de Montabert, On the Necessity of Theoretical and
Philosophical Teaching of the Arts in our Education (1843), in ART IN THEORY,
1815-1900: AN ANTHOLOGY OF CHANGING IDEAS at 214 (Charles Harrison, et al.
eds., 2001).
4. "[T]he only shock to the middle class in such 'shock art' is having to foot
the bill for it." Neil C. Patten, The Politics of Art and the Irony of Politics: How
the Supreme Court, Congress, the NEA, and Karen Finley Misunderstand Art and
Law in National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 37 HOus. L. REV. 559, 596
(2000).
5. Enrique R. Carrasco, The National Endowment for the Arts: A Search for an
Equitable Grant Making Process, 74 GEO. L.J. 1521, 1534 (1986) (referring to a
1984 production of Verdi's Rigoletto which transplanted the story to 1950's New
York and cast the characters as Mafia members, angering the Italian-American
community and Representative Mario Biaggi).
Fifth Amendment rights of the artists that it chooses to patronize or
ignore. Artistic work falls under the umbrella of free speech
protected by the First Amendment; 6 the free flow of ideas, like art
itself, is valued for its ability to broaden the minds of citizens.
Though the government is not affirmatively restricting speech, as in a
more conventional First Amendment context, the government's
spending power may have the same coercive effect as actual
regulations. Thus, because the government might selectively fund
artists based on their viewpoints, artists may find themselves
handicapped unless they self-censor in an effort to gain access to a
grant program. Additionally, the inherent ambiguity of arts funding
may raise concerns over due process, as artists are ultimately subject
to the opinions of those judging their art, which are difficult to
quantify or analyze. However, the status of a merit-based grant is
problematic when considered in a due process context; although
government funds are relied upon by artists, who may have an
expectation of receiving grants, 7 that expectation may not be enough
to trigger a due process analysis. It is necessary for the government
and the agencies that enact arts legislation to consider the proper
extent of their power to fund artists when speech is involved, as well
as possible obligations with which the artists should comply.
However, the NEA and similar agencies have to consider factors
aside from the constitutional implications of funding art; arts
agencies are also vulnerable to political and economic realities that
influence the government's funding priorities. In the past, the
funding of controversial artists or exhibitions has sparked criticism
from politicians, who have attempted to eliminate taxpayer funding
for an agency which they claim undermines the values held dear by
Americans. "[P]oliticians hostile to the N.E.A. portrayed artists as
deviants, with too great a sense of entitlement and too little sense of
social responsibility. Year after year the House of Representatives
pledged to shut down the endowment."
8
More mundane considerations also threaten arts agencies. As arts
6. See Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 602 (1998)
(Souter, J., dissenting).
7. Celia A. Cohen, An Endangered Species? Artistic Grants as a Vehicle for
the Evolution of Entitlements Law, 49 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1277, 1284 (1999).
8. Robin Pogrebin, Inheriting Uneasy Truce Between Art And Politics, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 24, 2001, at E8.
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funding is considered less vital than many federal and state programs,
politicians and their constituents will be hesitant to spend money on
art, especially controversial art, when that money could be put
towards more practical programs. "For many people the arts and arts
education are viewed as expendable, elitist luxuries rather than
necessary elements of a healthy democratic society." 9  Thus, arts
agencies are uniquely susceptible to budget cuts unless they can
convince the public that the arts are worthy of public support. This
year, states reduced funding for their arts agencies by an average of
twenty-three percent, with California cutting about ninety percent of
its arts funding and Missouri completely eliminating its arts
program.10 In cases where agencies' budgets increase, arts funding is
likely to attract the ire of those who find such spending wasteful.
President Bush's bid to increase the NEA's budget by $18 million 1'
quickly attracted criticism even though the funds were relatively
small in relation to the President's overall budget proposal.12
The NEA and arts agencies are thus faced with the dilemma of
ensuring that their decisions do not infringe on artists' constitutional
rights while convincing an often hostile public of the validity of its
mission. This paper will first examine the issues and the obligations
that arise in the context of arts regulation, considering the limitations
on the government's ability to fund as well as the limits of artists'
constitutional rights. Later, this paper will deal with the case of the
NEA and its enabling statute, focusing on the "decency and respect
9. Gioia, supra note 2.
10. Carl Hartman, Cash-Strapped States Cut Arts Funding, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 2,
2004, at E41. Federal funding has slightly increased in the past year, going from
115.7 million to 122.5 million, however, the seven million dollar increase in federal
funding is dwarfed by the over eighty million dollars in cuts by state arts agencies.
Id. The decline in government funding, along with the decrease in corporate
philanthropy, has had a significant effect on arts organizations which must be more
conscientious about finances, and therefore less able to take artistic risks. See
Stephanie Strom, Soft Financing Causes Arts Groups to Make Hard Choices, N.Y.
TIMES, June 19, 2004, at B7.
11. The vast majority of funding would go towards a new program titled
"American Masterpieces: Three Centuries of Artistic Genius." The Gift Horse,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2004, at A16.
12. "[T]he line item that has most riled the party's conservative activists is
trivial by comparison: it's the $18 million boost for the National Endowment for
the Arts - an agency long questioned by conservatives." Gail Chaddock, Budget
Austerity? Only in Part, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 2, 2004, at 2.
clause," which was added amid a period of criticism of the NEA's
mission and required the agency to consider "general standards of
decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the
American public" when making its funding decisions. 
13
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF ARTS FUNDING
The very idea of governmental funding for the arts raises certain
unique issues. Perhaps most significantly, the government's
patronage of the arts necessarily means that the government is
entering the area of expression, thereby creating potential First
Amendment issues. Although the government, as a patron, does not
forbid expression in a technical sense, an agency's power to allocate
funds, if done selectively, may indirectly cause artists to curb their
expression in order to get funding. The practical importance of
federal funds on an artist's reputation and livelihood ensures that
most artists will not risk losing these funds by expressing themselves
as freely as they might.
The subjective nature of the arts agencies' judgment is also
constitutionally problematic, as overly vague guidelines may violate
due process. Artists, unable to know for certain what the agency
requirements entail, must restrict their work in order to make sure
that it fits well within the unclear requirements for applicants.
Additionally, given the unquantifiable nature of these requirements,
artists who are denied funding will be unable to know how the
agency reached its decision, and even whether it based the denial on
merit or on the viewpoints expressed. In order to determine the
duties of arts agencies, it is necessary to consider the rights of those
who are applying for funding as well as those of the government.
A. Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson
One of the key early cases involving arts agencies is Advocates
for the Arts v. Thomson,14 which laid out many of the principles and
issues inherent to arts funding. The controversy arose in 1973, eight
13.20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) (2004).
14. Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792 (1st Cir. 1976) cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 894 (1976).
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years after the National Endowment for the Arts was created by
Congress.' 5 The state of New Hampshire, reacting to this legislation,
created the New Hampshire Commission on the Arts and gave it
authority over the state's grant program. 16  Eventually, the
Commission began to submit grant proposals of over $500 for the
approval of the Governor and Council; this practice was not codified
until 1975.17 Granite, a literary journal that had previously received
a grant from the Commission, was denied a second grant after the
Governor and Council judged a particular poem included in an
earlier, government-funded, issue of the magazine to be "an item of
filth."'18 This decision, based on a "personal adverse reaction to a
single poem," was challenged on both First and Fourteenth
Amendment grounds. 19
Turning to the First Amendment claim, the court found that
Granite did not suffer a constitutional harm.2 ° Significantly, the
court noted that there had been no affirmative governmental
suppression of speech; rather, the magazine had not received any
additional government support.21 Moreover, it was necessary in this
context for there to be denials based on a judgment of the artistic
merits of a work,22 and "courts have no particular institutional
competence warranting case-by-case participation in the allocation of
funds." 23 The court also denied that a more deliberate procedure
would be desirable. 24 In order to delineate the meaning of "artistic
merit" for purposes of administrative review, the Commission would
have needed to sacrifice the flexibility that was necessary to make
continued subjective judgments on the merits of various artistic
works. Artistic merit, by definition, eludes categorization and cannot
15. Thomson, 532 F.2d at 793.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. The Governor and Council had originally planned to approve the grant
but changed their minds after the poem was shown to them. Id.
19. Thomson, 532 F.2d at 794.
20. Id. at 798
21. Id. at 795.
22. "If such a program is to fulfill its purpose, the exercise of editorial
judgment by those administering it is inescapable." Id. at 796.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 797.
be fully translated into standards for review.
25
Near the end of its discussion, the court touched on the potential
for viewpoint discrimination in the funding context. For the court,
the existence of arts funding posed a certain threat; "[t]he real danger
in the injection of government money into the marketplace of ideas is
that the market will be distorted by the promotion of certain
messages but not others. ' 26 Thus, if there were evidence of a pattern
27
of discrimination, the Constitution would be implicated. The
Commission's decision in this case was not seen as adequate to raise
a constitutional question regarding discrimination, but the court
nonetheless acknowledged the potential for a viewpoint
discrimination claim in the context of a governmental arts funding
program.
2 8
The court found more substance behind Granite's contention that
there was a denial of due process when the Commission rejected
Granite's grant. However, the court ultimately decided that the
magazine did not qualify for due process protection, stating:
What is perhaps most troubling about this case is not
that Granite should be denied public support, but that
the denial should be based on a reading of just one
poem in a back issue, without consideration of the
overall quality of the publication either alone or as
compared to competing grant applicants. But we
doubt that this problem has a constitutional solution.
29
Although the court did not deny that the Commission may have
treated Granite arbitrarily, it noted that there is no "right to public
support of private expression."30 Granite did not have a property
interest in continued grant support and could not seek constitutional
25. Id.; see also Cara Putman, National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley: The
Supreme Court Missed an Opportunity to Clarify the Role of the NEA in Funding
the Arts: Are the Grants a Property Right or an Award?, 9 GEO. MASON U. CIV.
RTs. L.J. 237, 248 (1999).
26. Thomson, 532 F.2d at 798.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 797.
30. Id.
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treatment.
31
Even if such an interest were present, the court was skeptical that
there could be meaningful process due to "the ultimate necessity of
subjective judgment.",32 The court likewise found it difficult to claim
that any deprivation of a grant that would be awarded purely under
subjective artistic merit criteria could be given unfairly. 33 The court
concluded that a more formal finding on the matter of artistic merits
would have little substantive value, 4 and that the risks presented in
this case were not significant enough to argue that a costly hearing or
statement of reasons would be constitutionally necessary.35 Despite
the fact that the Governor and Council probably denied funds
arbitrarily, the nature of merit-based grants and art in general make
the availability of higher procedural requirements untenable.36
B. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad37
Southeastern Promotions dealt with the granting of theater space
controlled by the city as a form of subsidization. 38 In the case, the
Supreme Court found that the city, in its denial of theater space to
Southeastern for its production of the controversial musical Hair, had
imposed an unconstitutional prior restraint on the theater company.39
After receiving Southeastern's application, the directors voted to
disallow use of the space despite the fact that there were no
conflicting engagements at the theater.40  In addition, none of the
directors had been directly exposed to the play or script but relied on
31. Id.
32. Thomson, 532 F.2d at 797; see Cohen, supra note 7, at 1295-98 (for an
analysis of property rights in an art funding context).
33. Carrasco, supra note 5, at 1549.
34. Thomson, 532 F.2d at 797. The court goes so far as to say that such a
finding would only be of "cosmetic significance." Id.
35. Id.
36. The relative value of procedural requirements may be debated. "[P]erhaps
if the author had been offered the opportunity, he could have been able to explain
the symbolism and the ideas behind the poem. The court could not possibly have
known what would be the outcome of the hearing." Cohen, supra note 7, at 1299.
37. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
38. Id. Although the theater itself was privately owned, it had been under a
long-term lease to the city. Id. at 547.
39. Id. at 552.
40. Id. at 548.
secondhand knowledge in making the determination that the
production would be inappropriate. 41 Having made the determination
that a production of Hair was not "in the best interests of the
community,, 42 the directors notified Southeastern of the decision
without presenting a written statement of reasons.43  Southeastern
applied for an injunction, but the advisory jury determined that the
musical was obscene.44
The Court did not determine whether the finding of obscenity or
the standard used by the jury was correct; rather, it chose to focus on
the issue of whether the board's action consisted of an
unconstitutional prior restraint.45 Noting that "[a]n administrative
board assigned to screening stage productions - and keeping off stage
anything not deemed culturally uplifting or healthful - may well be
less responsive [to constitutional interests] than a court,"4 6and that
the risks of overbroad censorship are high, the Court concluded that
procedural protection must be provided.
The procedure followed in Southeastern Promotions was
considered to be highly inadequate. There was no procedure in place
that allowed Southeastern to quickly try its case on the merits,
thereby forcing Southeastern to reschedule the performances.48
Regardless of the validity of the board's decision, it failed in its duty
to provide safeguards to ensure that the production was not unjustly
49treated by the agency.
Notably, the Court did not believe that Southeastern's option of
performing the show at a private venue eliminated the possibility that
a constitutional violation had occurred. 50  Although the particular
facts indicated that other theaters would not be capable of housing
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 550.
45. Id. at 552. However, opinions varied in this 5-4 decision. See Carrasco,
supra note 5, at 1539-40.
46. Southeastern Promotions, 420 U.S. at 560-61.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 561-62.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 556
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the show,5' the existence of an alternative did not justify the
government in restricting use of its theater without some process. 52
The Court noted that "[o]ne is not to have the exercise of his liberty
of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may
be exercised in some other place." 53
Thus, the holding ensured that the artist seeking use of a state-
controlled theater has certain rights, although they are procedural
rather than expressive. However, the nature of the benefit, namely
the use of a theater, differs from the money grants at issue in many
other arts subsidies cases. 54
C. Brooklyn Institute of Arts and Sciences v. New York55
The court found a First Amendment injury in Brooklyn Institute,
which demonstrates the limitations of governmental power in a
funding context.56 The case arose out of the controversy surrounding
the museum's Sensation Exhibit and Mayor Rudolph Giuliani's
attempts to terminate funding for the museum. 57  Although the
museum was supported by the city of New York (the City), the City's
funding was relatively limited in scope, covering expenses related to
the museum's maintenance and educational programs, but not its
artistic endeavors. 58  The Sensation Exhibit, showcasing the
collection of Charles Saatchi, was not funded through the
government at all.59 However, city officials offended by the exhibit
moved to withdraw support from the Brooklyn Institute.60 Giuliani,
particularly taken aback by Chris Ofili's The Holy Virgin Mary, was
critical of the idea that a museum that displays "offensive" works
51. "[N]one apparently had the seating capacity, acoustical features, stage
equipment, and electrical service that the show required." Id.
52. id.
53. Id. (quoting Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939)).
54. Carrasco, supra note 5, at 1540-41.
55. Brooklyn Inst. of Arts & Scis. v. New York, 64 F. Supp. 2d 184 (E.D.N.Y.
1999).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 189.
59. Daniel Kunitz, True "Sensation" (Oct. 2, 1999), at
http://archive.salon.com/ent/feature/1999/10/O2/dung/.
60. Brooklyn Inst., 64 F. Supp. 2d at 186.
should be sponsored by the government in any form. 61 He stated:
"[y]ou don't have a right to a government subsidy to desecrate
someone else's religion .... [I]f you are a government subsidized
enterprise then you can't do things that desecrate the most personal
and deeply held views of the people in society. '  The City
eventually withheld payments and filed for ejectment, claiming "a
right to eject the Museum based solely on its perception of the
content of works in the Sensation Exhibit.
63
The court noted that the indirect as well as direct suppression of
ideas may create a First Amendment violation. 64 Citing Perry v.
Sindermann,65 the court furthered the notion that, while a party may
not be entitled to a benefit, the government is still constrained by
constitutional concerns:
[E]ven though the government may deny him the
benefit for a number of reasons, there are some
reasons upon which the government may not rely. It
may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that
infringes his constitutionally protected interests -
especially, his interest in freedom of speech .... This
would allow the government to 'produce a result
which [it] could not command directly.' Such
interference with constitutional rights is
impermissible.
66
Thus, the basic principle of unconstitutional conditions, which states
that the government cannot use the denial of benefits to curb a
constitutional right such as expression, was applied to the arts
funding context. While the City claimed that it did not preclude a
purely private exhibition which taxpayers do not have to help
61. Id. at 191.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 192-93. The City dropped earlier bases for ejectment in the suit. Id.
at 192.
64. Id. at 199.
65. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (stating that a professor without
tenure cannot be denied renewal of contract for criticism of the school's
administration).
66. Id. at 597 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)).
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finance, the aversion of taxpayers and government officials to the
artwork was considered irrelevant to the constitutional claim.67
D. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Giuliani68
In this case, the court dealt with a less hallowed form of artistic
expression: a public art exhibition. 69  In considering a public
exhibition with goals other than the free expression of ideas, such as
tourism, encouragement of civic spirit and appeal to a broad base of
viewers, the committee that administers the event may be required to
comply with somewhat different constitutional standards. These
standards, based on the nature of the forum in which the artwork is
being presented, are more generous in allowing the government to
control speech.
The exhibition in the case was New York City's CowParade, a
joint public-private enterprise 70 in which fiberglass cows had been
decorated, sponsored, and displayed in prominent places around the
city.7' The city's interest in CowParade was not simply an aesthetic
one; it had hoped to profit from increased tourism, the sale of
CowParade merchandise, and the eventual auction of the cows. 72 A
committee, set up by an agreement of the public and private parties
and consisting of city representatives, was given the discretion to
create submission guidelines and reject any submission that "includes
material that is indecent or demonstrates a lack of proper respect for
67. Brooklyn Inst., 64 F. Supp. 2d at 200.
[Taxpayers] subsidize all manner of views with which they do
not agree, indeed, which they may abhor, through tax exemptions
and deductions given to other taxpayers... where the denial of a
benefit, subsidy, or contract is motivated by a desire to suppress
speech in violation of the First Amendment, that denial will be
enjoined. That is all that is involved here.
Id.
68. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Giuliani, 105 F. Supp. 2d
294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
69. Id.
70. CowParade was co-hosted by New York and the private entities
CowParade, LLC, CowParade Holdings Corp., and CowParade NYC 2000, Inc.
Id. at 298.
71. Id. at 298-99.
72. Id. at 299.
public morals or conduct." 73 The guidelines eventually adopted by
the committee stressed that the exhibit was to be "festive, decorous,
whimsical, and appropriate for a broad-based audience of all ages,"
74
and excluded designs with religious, sexual, and political themes.
75
Submissions that were not rejected could be "adopted" by private
sponsors.
76
Although People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA)
had one of its two submissions approved,77 its second submission,
which "divided the cow into sections in a manner intended to
resemble a butcher shop chart .... with statement[s] or quotation[s]
'concerning the health and ethical problems associated with the
killing of cows for food," '7g was rejected. 79  The design was
unanimously "flagged" by the committee members, who
independently searched the designs for potentially troublesome
content.8 0  Taking note of three of the statements, the committee
"didn't reject the design merely because it compelled people to think
... . What troubled the committee was the provocative, graphic,
offensive effect of the text chosen. ' 'g PETA rejected the opportunity
to resubmit a slightly different design.
82
In determining whether the rejection could be considered a
content-based restriction, and therefore a violation of the First
Amendment, 83 the court in PETA determined that its analysis would
73. Id.
74. Id. at 320.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 300.
77. Organizations sponsor cows, typically created by other artists, for
CowParade, but PETA requested to have its own artist design the cows instead. Id.
The approved cow was covered with imitation leather and displayed the message
"buy fake for the COW'S sake." Id.
78. Id.
79. The other three rejected designs were "Moni-Cow Lewinsky," rejected as a
personal attack, a cow designed to look like a Hasidic Jew, considered potentially
offensive to Hasidic Jews, and a "stamp of approval" cow that was rejected as a
political attack on Mayor Giuliani. Id. at 301 n.7. Around 1200 designs were
accepted by the committee, and 500 of the accepted designs were eventually
sponsored. Id. at 301.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 302.
83. Id. at 304.
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turn on the question of how to properly classify CowParade as a
forum.84 In a traditional public forum, which is set aside for public
debate, the government "may enforce content-based exclusions and
promulgate content-neutral time, place and manner regulations of
speech., 8 5 However, the government has the burden of showing that
such restrictions are needed to further a compelling state interest and
are "narrowly drawn" to serve that interest.86  In contrast, the
government is given more latitude to regulate speech in a nonpublic
forum, which has not been designated for debate; the government
must only ensure that its restrictions are reasonable and that
suppression of speech is not based in government opposition to a
speaker's viewpoint. 87 The court also described an intermediate
category: the designated or limited purpose public forum, "created
either for a limited purpose, such as use by particular groups, or for
the discussion of certain subjects. 88
However, the court in PETA noted that this third category has
been the subject of confusion among courts. 89 Among the principal
Supreme Court cases in the analysis was Rosenberger v. Rector,90
which defined a university's method of allocating activities fees as a
limited purpose public forum.91  The Court in Rosenberger
distinguished the designated forum category and held that an
intermediate level of scrutiny was proper, and required any
restrictions to be not only reasonable, but viewpoint-neutral.
Moreover, a strict scrutiny test applies to judicial analysis of
viewpoint discrimination.93 A later interpretation of the designated
84. Id. at 304-05.
85. Id. at 305. The court cites Perry v. Sindermann for this principle and for
other concepts related to the classification of forums. Id.
86. Id. PETA argues that the CowParade, which uses public spaces such as
parks to display the decorated cows, is a traditional public forum. Id. at 311.
However, the court rejects this argument, noting that the government can "carve
out" spaces within public forums if such actions serve a valid purpose. Id. at 314.
Speech occurring in these nonpublic forums is subject to a lesser standard or
review. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
91. PETA, 105 F. Supp. 2d at 306-07.
92. Id. at 307
93.Id.
public forum doctrine 94defined a designated forum as one in which
the government intended to grant general access to a class of
speakers. 95  "[G]iving 'selective access' to a particular class of
speakers whose members must then individually 'obtain permission'
denotes a nonpublic forum."
96
The court moved on to consider the treatment of limited purpose
public forum in the Second Circuit. In Travis v. Owego-Apalachin
School District,97 a limited forum was described as a government-
created nonpublic forum in which expression was limited to "certain
kinds of speakers or to the discussion of certain subjects. 98 The
PETA court noted that the application of either a "reasonableness" or
"strict scrutiny" standard will depend on whether the speaker "falls
within the purpose for which the forum was created." 99
The often contradictory definitions of limited public forums
proved inconclusive for the court. Looking to the facts of the case,
the court noted that the cow sculptures, and the forum in question,
were financed and owned by private parties, 100 as well as sponsored
with a limited purpose in mind. 10 1 Given the intent to circumscribe
expression, as well as the fairly limited and private nature of
participation, the court was unable to find a public forum.1
0 2
94. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
95. PETA, 105 F. Supp. 2d at 307.
96. Id.
97. Travis v. Owego-Apalachin Sch. Dist., 927 F.2d 688 (1991).
98. Id. at 692 (citing PETA, 105 F. Supp. 2d at 308).
99. PETA, 105 F. Supp. 2d at 309.
100. The court stated:
The structures are owned not by PETA nor by the City, but by
the CowParade Organizers. The forum from which PETA's cow
design was excluded therefore is not a particular corner of a
sidewalk or park, but the actual cow artwork with the message
PETA would place there under the auspices of the CowParade
program.
Id. at 317.
101. From the beginning, the government imposed limits on the size of the
forum as well as the expression that was allowed. Id.
102. Id. at 355-36. The use of the "forum doctrine" in cases involving
government funding of speech is criticized by Frederick Schauer:
In the typical case, the complaint is not about access, but about
discriminatory treatment. And at the heart of this issue is the
seemingly banal but quite important point that content-based
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Having determined the CowParade to be a nonpublic forum
subject to a lighter degree of scrutiny, the court turned to the
guidelines and decision-making process of the Commission.
103
Noting the artistic context of the Commission's guidelines, the court
denied PETA's contention that they were overbroad. 10 4 As was
noted in Thomson and other arts cases, vague regulations may be
upheld in order to allow the government to regulate artistic
programs. 105 The government, when acting as patron, "requires a
reasonable zone for exercise of discretion and flexibility which is not
always capable of being articulated as precise and universal
standards."106 Moreover, the exhibition's guidelines and restrictions
have a reasonable basis: to increase tourism and appeal to many
groups across society. Restricting access was necessary in order to
achieve these aims:
Were the art exhibit to turn into such a carnival and
maelstrom of public protest, the capital investment
expended by its proponents to produce it would be
imperiled, as would be the reasonable expectations of
the government and the CowParade Organizers of
generating the revenues necessary to fulfill some of
the other primary purposes they contemplated for the
event. 107
discriminatory treatment is appropriate in some contexts, but not
in others. Yet once we recognize the idea, the point of combining
the determination of which contexts permit content
discrimination and which do not with public forum analysis is
elusive.
Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112
HARV. L. REv. 84, 98-99 (1998).
103. PETA, 105 F. Supp. 2d at 321.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 322.
107. Id. at 330. However, the court does not accept the City's contention that
CowParade is merely "humorous entertainment" which is not intended to spark any
sort of debate and that PETA's "message-based designs" are therefore inconsistent
with the stated purpose of the event. Id. at 323. Such a position "implies that, as
though by some Cartesian means, art may be disassociated from ideas, or entirely
drained of conceptual content, leaving a residue of nothingness. This [c]ourt cannot
lend weight to that premise .... In fact, art is a poetry of ideas, a medium for the
very embodiment of thought." Id.
Broad guidelines excluding certain designs were appropriate in this
case, given that acceptance of the designs was a matter of artistic
discretion and that the event was created to promote tourism and to
entertain a variety of passersby, rather than to allow for a wide range
of expression.
Moreover, the Committee's actions towards PETA were fair in
light of the restrictions provided by the guidelines. The Committee
did not give a flat denial; rather, it explained the reasons that the
submission did not comport with the aims of the project and gave the
organization an opportunity to amend its design. 0 8 The potentially
broad guidelines were also augmented by an internal memorandum,
which further codified and standardized the Committee's selection
procedure. 109 The uniformity of the selection process, and the
explanation of a reasoning process, seemed to negate contentions that
the Committee was not acting reasonably.
E. Rights and Responsibilities
Although Thomson, Southeastern Promotions, Brooklyn Institute,
and PETA vary in terms of the role played by the government and the
interest of the affected artist or speaker, all four cases illustrate
concepts that can be applied in the context of art patronage by a
government agency and help to delineate the boundaries of First
Amendment protection in cases where arts subsidies are involved.
As a general rule, the arts are by their very nature a matter of value
judgment and discretion, and thus, the government and agencies
which control funding are given some latitude in the development of
workable standards. The nature and purpose of the art subsidization
program itself may also alter the extent to which expression is
protected. If the government is implementing an arts program which
will necessarily have a limited scope, it may have greater justification
for limiting artworks to those that fit within the scope of that
program. Thus, when the government reasonably does not intend to
open a program to a diverse group of voices, more restrictions are
acceptable, and the government must face greater scrutiny if it
creates a program that is meant to support free debate or expression.
108. Id. at 324.
109. Id. at 325.
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However, the government is not given unbridled discretion and
cannot allocate funds in a manner that would constitute improper
viewpoint discrimination. The denial of funding, which may not
technically be a vested proprietary right, may nonetheless implicate
concerns similar to the denial of property. It appears that courts have
generally not interpreted merit-based grants as "proprietary" rights
deserving of due process protection. However, courts have
considered the interests of potential grantees as similar to those of the
untenured professor in Perry v. Sindermann;110 while the government
has the right to take away the grant, it may not be able to do so for
reasons which implicate a constitutional right, particularly if the
decision to deny funding is based on aversion to a particular point of
view.
III. CASE STUDY: THE NEA's "DECENCY AND RESPECT"
REQUIREMENTS
The most prominent arts agency in the United States is,
unsurprisingly, the National Endowment for the Arts, which was
created in 1965 with the express aim of fostering "a climate
encouraging freedom of thought, imagination, and inquiry."'
However, carrying out its mandate is not as straightforward as it
might look, as the NEA must also accommodate an often hostile
legislature, which may explicitly or implicitly encourage the agency
to fund projects that are less controversial or distasteful to taxpayers.
The so-called "decency and respect" clause that is currently
incorporated into the agency's enabling statute is a direct result of
this controversy. The attempts of the agency and courts to grapple
with this phrase demonstrate the unique challenges inherent in a
110. Perry, 408 U.S. 593.
111. Kimberly Schmaltz, National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley:
Viewpoint Discrimination Masked as the Government's Foray Into the Realm of
Art Patron, 26 N. KY. L. REV. 337, 338 (1999) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 951(7)
(1965)).
112. Carrasco, supra note 5, at 1525. Carrasco illustrates the antipathy that
was felt towards the arts, providing as examples: a 1665 incident in which
Virginians were prosecuted for producing a play; a Pennsylvania statute from 1700
which prohibited stage plays, masks, and revels; and some colonial Americans'
opposition to English ballad operas. Id.
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program that provides government subsidies for creative expression.
A. A History of Arts Funding and the NEA
Government subsidization of artists and arts programs have been
implemented fairly recently. In contrast to Europe, colonial America
was unsupportive of the arts. 1 1 2 Private patronage began to flourish
in the nineteenth century, and Presidents James Buchanan, Theodore
Roosevelt, and William Howard Taft unsuccessfully attempted to
establish federal arts programs. 113  The first federally funded art
programs arose during the Depression, when the Federal Arts Project
(FAP) and Federal Theatre Project (FTP) were created as part of the
Works Progress Administration (WPA)." l4 However, the aims of the
programs were not to promote artistic or cultural merit, but rather to
provide jobs for the unemployed. 1 5 Although the programs helped to
promote the careers of various artists, including Jackson Pollock,
Stuart Davis, and Orson Welles," 6 they were weakened in the wake
of fears that allowing artists to have so much freedom of expression
would lead to the creation of Communist propaganda. 117  Both
programs were eliminated by the time of World War 11.118
It was not until the mid-1960s that the government took up the
task of supporting the arts again. President Kennedy and President
Johnson each appointed Special Assistants on the Arts, and Johnson
created a National Council on the Arts. 119 The NEA was one step
further in promoting artistic and cultural excellence as values
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1526.
115. Id. "[I]n qualifying for the subsidies more weight was assigned to
financial need rather than true 'artistic excellence."' Craig J. Flores, Indecent
Exposure: An Analysis of the NEA's "Decency and Respect" Provision, 5 UCLA
ENT. L. REv. 251, 257 (1998).
116. Brenda L. Tofte, "Baby, It's Cold Outside:" The Chilling Effect of the
Decency Clause on the Arts in the Aftermath of National Endowment for the Arts v.
Finley, 22 HAMLINE L. REv. 303, 314 (1998).
117. Id. at 313-15.
118. Id.
119. Carrasco, supra note 5, at 1526.
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inherent to Johnson's "Great Society."' 12  For the program's
proponents, the artist, as the quintessential "individual," could serve
as a representative for America, standing against Soviet
conformity. 12  However, support for the bill was not universal, and
several artists were concerned that federal subsidization of the arts
would infringe on artists' freedom or promote the creation of an
official school of art. 122
The final legislation establishing the National Foundation for the
Arts and Humanities seemed to reflect these ideals and concerns,
demonstrating an intention to "develop and promote a broadly
conceived national policy of support for the humanities and the arts
in the United States"'1 23 and expressly prohibiting control over the
programs of grantees.124 The NEA was given a three-tiered structure
consisting of a chairperson appointed by the President, 125 the
National Council on the Arts, which itself consisted of the
chairperson as well as twenty-six appointees from the private
sector, 126 and advisory panels which were made up of experts in areas
that are under review. 127 The chairperson had the final responsibility
to ensure that the requirements for selection were fulfilled by an
120. Id. at 1527. "The concept of the Great Society is unthinkable without a
rich and flourishing cultural life. We lead the world in scientific achievement. Our
standard of living is the highest in the world. We can afford to enjoy material
things like no other nation on the globe." Id.
121. MICHAEL BRENSON, VISIONARIES AND OUTCASTS: THE NEA, CONGRESS,
AND THE PLACE OF THE VISUAL ARTISTS IN AMERICA 16-18 (The New Press 2001).
122. Carrasco, supra note 5, at 1528. Critics, in an allusion to Stalin's
"cultural watchdog" Zhdanov, expressed fears that the program would create
"federal czars over the arts and humanities." Id.
123. 20 U.S.C. § 953(b).
124. "In the administration of this subchapter no department, agency, officer,
or employee of the United States shall exercise any direction, supervision, or
control over the policy determination, personnel, or curriculum, or the
administration or operation of any school or other non-Federal agency, institution,
organization, or association." 20 U.S.C. § 953(c).
125. 20 U.S.C. § 954(b)(1).
126. Carrasco, supra note 5, at 1530. Among the first members of the
National Council on the Arts were Marian Anderson, Leonard Bernstein, Duke
Ellington, Gregory Peck, Richard Rogers, and John Steinbeck. Nat'l Endowment
for the Arts, History and Purpose, available at
http://www.nea.gov/about/NCA/About 
_NCA.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2004).
127. Carrasco, supra note 5, at 1530-31.
applicant who was selected for funding. 128
B. The Controversy over Arts Funding
The NEA soon became a prominent political target; politicians
have reacted to various controversial works by criticizing a system
that could reward artists for producing works that appeared
antithetical to the values of taxpayers who ultimately subsidize these
artists. Although the vast majority of works did not attract
controversy, 129 a few federally funded artworks prompted groups to
try and overhaul the agency's grant process, or even disband the
NEA itself. A 1984 production of Rigoletto, which modernized the
setting to incorporate the New York Mafia, led the Italian-American
community to protest the stereotypical portrayal of Italians.1
30
Eventually, Representative Mario Biaggi proposed to amend the
National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act to prohibit
grantees from using NEA funds "to denigrate any ethnic, racial,
religious or minority group" and to monitor grantee productions in
order to ensure compliance. 
131
Further controversy arose in 1989 and 1990, when controversial
work from photographers Robert Mapplethorpe and Andres Serrano
came under fire, prompting Congress to check the NEA to prevent
similarly offensive works from being funded in the future.
132
128. 20 U.S.C. § 954(d).
129. "Throughout the NEA's history, only a handful of the agency's roughly
100,000 awards have generated formal complaints about misapplied funds or abuse
of the public's trust." Finley, 524 U.S. at 574.
130. Carrasco, supra note 5, at 1521.
131. Id. at 1522-23. "[T]here should be a sensitivity. I don't think we should
have censorship. But censorship and sensitivity, what separates them is a very fine
line." Id. at 1523; see also Flores, supra note 115, at 261-63.
132. Flores, supra note 115, at 252-53. Jesse Helms states his opinion on the
NEA after funds go towards Serrano's "Piss Christ":
The Constitution may prevent the government from prohibiting
this Serrano fellow's - laughably, I will describe it - artistic
expression. It certainly does not require the American taxpayers
or the Federal Government to fund, promote, honor, approve, or
condone it. None of the above. Mr. President, the National
Endowment's procedures for selecting artists and works of art
deserving of taxpayer support are badly, badly flawed if this is an
example of the kind of programs they fund with taxpayers'
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Congress decreased the NEA's budget, subtracting the exact amount
of money that was used to pay for the Mappelthorpe and Serrano
exhibits. 133  In October of 1989, Congress compromised on an
amendment to the NEA's statute. According to the amendment,
NEA funds could not go towards work that the agency judged to be
obscene. 134 When this requirement was held to be unconstitutional
by the District Court's decision in Bella Lewitzky Dance Foundation
v. Frohnmayer,135 the NEA decided not to appeal the decision.
Congress, with advice from an independent commission of
constitutional law scholars, reformed its grant procedures. 136
Congress adjusted its earlier amendment, eventually
implementing the "decency and respect" clause.' 37 This provision,
which was described by its author as "add[ing] to the criteria of
artistic excellence and artistic merit, a shell, a screen, a viewpoint
that must be constantly taken into account on behalf o[f] the
American public,"'138 and "mandat[ing] that in the awarding of funds,
in the award process itself, general standards of decency must be
accorded,' 139 provided that applications were to be judged on the
money ... [w]ell, they do not know what they are doing. They
are insulting the very fundamental basis of this country. I say
again I resent it.
135. Cong. Rec. S5594-01 (daily ed. May 18, 1989) (statement of
Sen. Helms).
133. Flores, supra note 115, at 262-63.
134. Bella Lewitzky Dance Foundation v. Frohnmayer, 754 F. Supp. 774, 776
(C.D. Cal. 1991).
135. Id.
136. The Commission's report:
[c]oncluded that there is no constitutional obligation to provide
arts funding, but also recommended that the NEA rescind the
certification requirement and cautioned against legislation setting
forth any content restrictions. Instead, the Commission suggested
procedural changes to enhance the role of advisory panels and a
statutory reaffirmation of 'the high place the nation accords to the
fostering of mutual respect for the disparate beliefs and values
among us.'
Finley, 524 U.S. at 575.
137. The amendments also determined that the judiciary, not the NEA, could
declare something obscene under Miller, that NEA panels would be more diverse,
and that grants would not have content restrictions. Tofte, supra note 116, at 323.
138. Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 100 F.3d 671, 677 (9th Cir.
1996) (quoting 136 Cong. Rec. H9417 (Oct. 11, 1990)) (emphasis added).
139. Id. (quoting Cong. Rec. H9457 (Oct. 11, 1990)) (emphasis added).
basis of merit, 140 while "taking into consideration general standards
of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the
American public."' 4P The NEA accommodated Congress' mandate
by ensuring that the advisory panels would be diverse, as they would
more accurately represent the nation itself because, by extension,
their considerations would reflect the concerns and values of the
people.142 This interpretation was also advantageous in that it was
less likely to result in limitations on funding. 143
C. Bella Lewitzky v. Frohnmayer
Bella Lewitzky arose under a version of the NEA statute which
existed after the October 1989 amendment and prohibited the funding
of works that the NEA judged as possibly obscene. 144 The statute
further described work that "may be considered obscene [as]
including but not limited to, depictions of sadomasochism,
homoeroticism, the sexual exploitation of children, or individuals
engaged in sex acts and which, when taken as a whole, do not have
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."'145 In response,
the NEA added a new "certification requirement" to its grant request
forms in which the grantee had to certify that funds would not be
used to "promote, disseminate, or produce" works that the NEA may
judge to be obscene. 146 The NEA, in its internal Statement of Policy,
also indicated that the previously articulated "Miller standard"
147
would be used.'
148
The Bella Lewitzky Dance Company, (the Company) 149 having
140. The statute noted that obscenity "is without artistic merit" and would not
be funded. 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(2).
141. 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1).
142. Finley, 524 U.S. at 577.
143. Putman, supra note 25, at 253-54.
144. Bella Lewitzky, 754 F. Supp. at 774.
145. Id. (quoting Department of the Interior and Related Agencies
Appropriation Act § 304(a) (1990)).
146. Id.
147. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
148. Bella Lewitzky, 754 F. Supp. at 777 n. 4.
149. The Company, a Los Angeles-based dance troupe, was created in 1966 by
dancer Bella Lewitzky. Lewitzky has been the recipient of multiple awards and
honorary doctorates, including a National Medal of Arts in 1997. The Company
Fall 2004 Agencies and the Arts
294 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 24-2
earned a $72,000 grant, had to comply with the new requirement;
however, Bella Lewitzkf's manager simply crossed out the
certification requirement. 1  Later, the NEA notified the Company,
indicating that if funds were to be spent, all the terms of the grant
needed to be complied with, including the agreement not to use funds
on works that the NEA could find obscene. if]
In finding summary judgment for the Company, the court found
that the statute and certification requirement violated both the First
and Fifth Amendment rights of Bella Lewitzky. 152 The court found
that the vague certification requirement was likely to have a chilling
effect on speech, causing any grant recipient who was attentive to the
requirement to avoid any artwork that might, by a stretch of the
imagination, be considered obscene by the NEA:
[T]he vagueness of the statute forces grant recipients
to avoid even coming close to the line between what is
merely provocative and what is proscribed.., because
NEA applicants must certify that they will not violate
Section 304's vague restrictions, many major
legitimate artistic projects will not be undertaken
either for fear of violating the vague terms of the
certification, or even merely for fear of becoming
embroiled in a dispute with the NEA over an
accusation that the work of art in question might
violate the certification.153
The Company could never completely know what the NEA may
consider to be obscene. Even though the agency had resolved in its
policy statements to use the clear Miller standard, it was not bound to
follow that policy and could change its policies at will.154 The
statute's vague requirements therefore made it likely that any artist
ended after its 1996-1997 season. Valley College, Alumni, at
http://www.valleycollege.edu/sbvchtm/index-
past.php?page=alumni-lewitzky.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2004); see also Bella
Lewitzky, THE ECONOMIST, Jul. 24, 2004, at 79.
150. Bella Lewitzky, 754 F. Supp. at 776-77.
151. Id. at 777.
152. Id. at 781, 783.
153. Id. at 782 (quoting Rockefeller Foundation amicus brief at 54).
154. Id.
who genuinely attempted to comply with the grant requirements
would find their expression limited, as grantees would feel compelled
to self-censor in order to ensure that funding is not taken away.'55
The statute, being unconstitutionally vague, was determined to
violate the Company's due process rights.' 56 The court outlined the
reasons that vagueness infringes on due process rights; vague laws
fail to provide notice or warning of potential violations, eliminate
safeguards against arbitrary application of the law, and, as noted
before, inhibit or "chill" potentially sensitive speech.' 5 7 "Obscenity,"
which had been "left to the judgment of the National Endowment for
the Arts,"' 158 is a malleable concept in spite of the agency's attempt to
avail itself of the more concrete "Miller" definition of obscenity.
Moreover, the court noted that the NEA was unable to provide artists
with the procedural safeguards associated with Miller, particularly its
requirement for a jury to determine the community's understanding
of "obscenity."' 159 "[T]he NEA is a national-level agency that, by
hypothesis, is incapable of applying varying community standards for
obscenity... how it will endeavor to do so in a grantee's particular
local community is a matter about which grantees may only
'speculat[e] at their peril.""160
Finally, the court touched on the nature of the rights that
subsidized artists should have, strongly rejecting the notion that the
government has not violated the constitutional rights of artists due to
its refusal to subsidize speech, as opposed to an affirmative
suppression.' 6 ' Citing Sindermann, the court found that the NEA
attempted to impose an unconstitutional condition on Bella Lewitzky
and other grantees; although grantees do not have an express "right"
to funding, the NEA cannot condition a grant that has already been
awarded on compliance with requirements that are unconstitutionally
155.Id. at 783.
156. Id. at 781.
157. Id. (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972)).
158. Id. at 782.
159. Id.
160. Id. (quoting Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54, 58-59 (1967)). The NEA's
later focus on diverse advisory panels when analyzing "decency and respect" may
be considered a response to this argument.
161. Id. at 785.
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vague.162 The court also determined that the possibility of seeking
only private funds was not a meaningful alternative, given the
realities of the NEA and its position in the art world:
Plainly stated, the NEA occupies a dominant and
influential role in the financial affairs of the art world
in the United States. Because the NEA provides much
of its support with conditions that require matching or
co-funding from private sources, the NEA's funding
involvement in a project necessarily has a multiplier
effect in the competitive market for funding of artistic
endeavors... NEA grants lend prestige and legitimacy
to projects and are therefore critical to the ability of
artists and companies to attract non-federal funding
sources. Grant applicants rely on the NEA well
beyond the dollar value of any particular grant. 163
For the Bella Lewitsky court, the practical importance of federal aid
for artists and foundations strengthened the government's
obligations; an agency could not act with impunity simply because it
provided a discretionary grant, but must act in such a way that the
NEA's "power of the purse" did not compel grantees to suppress
their speech. 1
64
D. National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley
The constitutional validity of this Congressional compromise was
disputed in Finley, in which the "Finley Four," a group of
performance artists 165 who had been denied grants in spite of their
162. Id. at 782.
163. Id. at 783.
164. Id.
165. The group consisted of Karen Finley, Tim Miller, Ho Hughes, and John
Fleck. Finley, who became the chief "spokesperson" for the movement against the
clause, used her performance art to make a statement against the oppression of
women by appearing "nude, covered only by chocolate and alfalfa sprouts as she
recounts a sexual assault." Gary Devlin, NEA v. Finley: Explicating the Rocky
Relationship Between the Government and the Arts, 27 PEPP. L. REv. 345, 351
(2000).
earlier approval by the advisory panel,166 presented a facial challenge
to the NEA's "decency and respect" clause. Their challenge had
been successful at both the district court and circuit court levels; 167
the courts found a restriction on artists' First Amendment freedoms
as the statute "seeks to dissuade the NEA from funding what is
'indecent.' When a statute directed at speech is overbroad, as is the
decency clause, it gives rise to the hazard that 'a substantial loss or
impairment of freedoms of expression will occur."' 1 68 The clause
was eventually upheld by the Supreme Court, but the decision did not
entirely serve the interests of those members of Congress who had
pushed for the NEA legislation. Though artists were unable to
overturn a clause that pushed for consideration of factors unrelated to
merit during the grant process, that clause was divested of much of
its meaning by the Court, who gave the NEA great discretion in
applying the legislation.' 
69
1. The Majority
Writing for the majority, 17  Justice O'Connor began by
emphasizing the heavy burden that those raising a facial challenge to
legislation must bear. "[R]espondents must demonstrate a substantial
risk that application of the provision will lead to the suppression of
speech." 171 Ultimately, she did not find that risk to be present in the
"decency and respect" clause, which would not eliminate the
possibility of funding for applicants who produce indecent work.1
72
166. Patten, supra note 4, at 566. "[D]espite the Panel's unanimous
recommendation that individual plaintiffs be awarded fellowships as 'individuals of
exceptional talent,' Frohnmayer denied those fellowships for political reasons, i.e.,
to appease congressional critics." Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 795
F. Supp. 1457, 1465 (C.D. Cal. 1992).
167. Patten, supra note 4, at 566.
168. Finley, 795 F. Supp. at 1476 (quoting Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S.
479, 486 (1965)).
169. "The operation was a success, but the patient died .... [The Court]
sustains the constitutionality of 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) by gutting it." Finley, 524
U.S. at 590 (Scalia, J., concurring).
170. Ginsburg joined in part, Scalia wrote a concurrence in which Thomas
joined, and Souter dissented. Finley, 524 U.S. at 569.
171. Id. at 580.
172. Id.
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Likewise, she did not find that the statute is viewpoint discriminatory
in a way that would invalidate it. 173  The subjectivity of such
requirements, which may arguably put applicants at risk for
viewpoint discrimination, did not introduce a greater risk than an
already subjective determination of artistic merit. 174
Significantly, the Court was able to find the clause constitutional
in large part because the majority considered it to be "hortatory."' 175
The clause would not require that "offensive" artists be denied
funding. Looking at the language of the statute, the Court agreed with
the NEA's reading: "the provision [is] merely hortatory ... it stops
well short of an absolute restriction. ' ' 176  The decision reflected a
degree of deference to Congress and the legislative process. As
"Congress has wide latitude to set spending priorities,"' 177 it is within
the power of Congress to selectively fund in order to achieve a valid
purpose, such as improving public confidence in the NEA. 178
O'Connor emphasized the process by which the statute was
developed. She contrasted the absolute restriction on obscenity with
the treatment of "indecent" or "disrespectful" art, which may
ultimately be funded. 179 Likewise, the provision was characterized as
a compromise which had been "introduced as a counterweight to
amendments aimed at eliminating the NEA's funding or substantially
constraining its grant-making authority. ' 8  Using "advisory
language" to determine the NEA's responsibilities, it incorporated
recommendations by the Independent Commission, focusing on
173. Id. at 583. O'Connor also argues that consideration of "decency and
respect" is constitutionally appropriate in several contexts contemplated by the
NEA enabling statute, particularly educational and cultural heritage programs.
However, she concludes that these possible applications are not dispositive. Id. at
584-85.
174. "[I]t seems unlikely that this provision will introduce any greater element
of selectivity than the determination of 'artistic excellence' itself." Id. at 584.
Although the Court is looking at the case as a facial challenge to the provision, it is
interesting to note that the artists in Finley may well have been rejected in spite of
their merit by an NEA which did not want to incur Congress' wrath.
175. "Tending or serving to exhort" OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 423
(Heald Colleges ed. 1980).
176. Finley, 524 U.S. at 580.
177. Id. at 588.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 581.
180. Id.
"procedure" rather than banning particular categories of speech.181
The majority did not address whether the NEA, in forming diverse
panels, complied with Congress' "suggestion" to consider these
factors in its application procedure. 182
In addressing the claims that the statute is vague, and therefore
implicates the First and Fifth Amendments, the majority did not deny
that the language of the statute is imprecise. "The terms of the
provision are undeniably opaque, and if they appeared in a criminal
statute or regulatory scheme, they could raise substantial vagueness
concerns.' 1 83 However, the Court concluded that it was appropriate
to have a different standard for particularity when the government
had been placed in the position of a "patron" rather than a
"sovereign," as noncompliance with the standards of a grant program
would not yield the same consequences as noncompliance with a
criminal or regulatory law. 184  Furthermore, vagueness may be
inevitable in a situation where the NEA or another agency handed out
grants based on criteria such as merit.'
85
Finally, Justice O'Connor rejected the argument that the NEA
had excluded the artists from a limited public forum. For her, a
parallel to Rosenberger v. Rector,186 in which it was held
unconstitutional for a public university to deny funding for the
printing of a Christian student newspaper, was inappropriate;
although both cases dealt with institutions which provided limited
funding, funding for university publications is given
"indiscriminately" with an aim towards enabling debate and
expression, whereas arts funding is selectively given with a goal of
promoting "excellence."'187 "The NEA's mandate is to make esthetic
judgments, and the inherently content-based 'excellence' threshold
for NEA support sets it apart."'
88
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 588.
184. Id. at 589. However, while a lesser standard may be appropriate, the
Court notes that "the First Amendment certainly has application in the subsidy
context." Id. at 587.
185. Id. at 589.
186. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
187. Finley, 524 U.S. at 586.
188. Id. (emphasis added).
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2. Concurrence and Dissent
Scalia's concurrence and Souter's dissent, following similar lines
of argument, ultimately reached different conclusions about the
constitutionality of the provision. Both determined that the terms of
the statute imposed an affirmative requirement to favor "respectful"
art, even if some controversial artwork may ultimately be funded. In
addition, both were critical of the NEA's reading, which did not
comply with the terms of the statute and rendered the statutory
language redundant. However, Scalia and Souter differed as to
whether such viewpoint discrimination is constitutional.
The majority's view that the statute was constitutional because it
was "hortatory" and did not impose an absolute restriction was
criticized by both the concurrence and dissent. For Scalia and
Souter, if the statute itself was to be taken seriously, it would have to
be considered viewpoint discriminatory. The provision, as it created a
mandatory restriction on the actions of the NEA, could not be
analyzed as merely suggestive.
One can regard [the decency and respect criteria] as
either suggesting that decency and respect are
elements of what Congress regards as artistic
excellence and merit, or as suggesting that decency
and respect are factors to be taken into account in
addition to artistic excellence and merit. But either
way, it is entirely, 100% clear that decency and
respect are to be taken into account in evaluating
applications. This is so apparent that I am at a loss to
understand what the Court has in mind (other than the
gutting of the statute) when it speculates that the
statute is merely 'advisory.' 189
Likewise, the fact that the statute made it possible for funds to be
granted to controversial artwork did not eliminate its viewpoint
discriminatory nature because, given applications of equal merit, the
agency would invariably choose those which were more in tune with
the "decency and respect" considerations over those which were
189. Id. at 591 (Scalia, J., concurring).
controversial. 19  As any considerations related to community
standards such as "decency" are "quintessentially viewpoint based
[and] require discrimination on the basis of conformity with
mainstream mores," 191 they could only be constitutional if such
discrimination is permissible in a subsidy context.
The existence of viewpoint discrimination "is not altered by the
fact that the statute does not 'compel' the denial of funding, any more
than a provision imposing a five-point handicap on all black
applicants is saved from being race discrimination by the fact that it
does not compel the rejection of black applicants."' 192 The intent
behind the provision itself was to ensure that awards to artists such as
Mappelthorpe and Serrano were not granted, and this underlying
intent did not change when Congress made concessions by declining
to impose a more absolute restriction.
[I]t cannot be read as tolerating awards to spread
indecency or disrespect, so long as the review panel,
the National Council on the Arts, and the Chairperson
have given some thought to the offending qualities
and decided to underwrite them anyway. That, after
all, is presumably just what prompted the
congressional outrage in the first place, and there was
nothing nafve about the Representative who said he
voted for the bill because it does 'not tolerate wasting
Federal funds for sexually explicit photographs [or]
sacrilegious works.'
1 93
The possibility of funding for "indecent" or "disrespectful" works of
art did not rescue the statute from being viewpoint discriminatory;
there still existed a pattern of discrimination in favor of less
controversial works despite the fact that this bias could be overcome
by a highly meritorious work.
Given this interpretation of the statute, Scalia and Souter were
highly critical of the NEA's implementation of this requirement by
190. Id. at 593.
191. Id. at 605 (Souter, J., dissenting).
192. Id. at 593 (Scalia, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted).
193. Id. at 609 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting 136 Cong. Rec. 28676 (1990)).
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ensuring review by representative groups. Firstly, the statute seemed
to require mandatory deliberation on matters of decency in each
decision, but the NEA's interpretation merely made it more likely
that the panels would raise concerns related to community mores.
"The reference to considering decency and respect occurs in the
subparagraph speaking to the 'criteria by which applications are
judged' . . . it is in judging applications that decency and respect are
most obviously to be considered," 194 and it was therefore
contradictory to implement such a requirement by expecting it to
"occur derivatively through the inclinations of the panel
members." 195  Though this interpretation could have made an
accurate judgment of what "decency and respect" means more
possible, it would not require or ensure that such a judgment would
take place. 196 Moreover, this interpretation seemed redundant given
that the NEA was already statutorily required to compose diverse
panels.197 If having a diverse panel was enough to ensure compliance
with the "decency and respect" provision, the clause itself would be
"wholly superfluous."' 198 Both justices were critical of the fact that
the majority simply ignored the issue of the NEA's compliance and
what faithful compliance to the statute might require.
However, Scalia and Souter parted on the issue of whether a
statute requiring viewpoint discrimination when subsidizing
expression would be constitutional. In Scalia's opinion, he suggested
that the clause, or even a more sweeping restriction on the content of
arts funding, would be constitutional because Congress was able to
selectively fund certain viewpoints. For him, the denial of funding
would not invoke the First Amendment as it did not prevent
expression. "Congress did not abridge the speech of those who
disdain the beliefs and values of the American public, nor did it
abridge indecent speech. Those who wish to create indecent and
disrespectful art are as unconstrained now as they were before the
enactment of the statute." 199  Ultimately, favoring certain
perspectives "is the very business of government, ' 2°° and the
194. Id. at 607.
195. Id. at 608 (Souter, J., dissenting).
196. Id. at 591-92 (Scalia, J., concurring).
197. 20 U.S.C. § 959(c).
198. Finley, 524 U.S. at 592 (Scalia, J., concurring).
199. Id. at 595 (Scalia, J., concurring).
200. Id. at 598 (Scalia, J., concurring).
government is thus entitled to discriminate directly or indirectly, as it
does when it funds art subject to certain conditions. 20 Moreover, the
dissent indicated that Rosenberger would not apply, as the limited
public forum established by the university was different in nature
from "the NEA's granting of highly selective (if not highly
,,202discriminating) awards. For Justice Scalia, the First Amendment
rights of artists do not apply when they are seeking money to fund
their art, but only when their conduct is being regulated.2 °3
Souter ultimately found that the provision violated the
Constitution. "The Government has wholly failed to explain why the
statute should be afforded an exemption from the fundamental rule of
the First Amendment that viewpoint discrimination in the exercise of
public authority over expressive activity is unconstitutional. 20 4
Emphasizing the primacy of the concept that society cannot limit
expression merely because it conflicts with general mores, Souter did
not restrict that notion to a criminal or regulatory context, but applied
it "not only to affirmative suppression of speech, but also to
disqualification for government favors." 20 5 Souter considered the
government's position as "patron" as compared to its roles as
"speaker" and "regulator," concluding that it would be more fitting to
consider the patronage role as analogous to that of a regulator.206 For
Souter, Rosenberger controlled the outcome because, in both cases,
an institution had been created with the purpose of funding and
thereby encouraging a multiplicity of views rather than expressing
the government's own point of view. 207  In "subsidizing the
expression of others, [the government] may not prefer one lawfully
stated view over another." Moreover, the competitive and scarce
nature of the grants did not create an exception to this principle, as
funds can be legitimately allocated using merit, which Souter
characterized as a vague but relatively viewpoint-neutral standard, as
a criterion for filtering applications without implicating viewpoint-
201. Id.
202. Id. at 599.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 600-01 (Souter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
205. Id. at 601 (Souter, J., dissenting).
206. Id. at 611-12 (Souter, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 613.
208. Id.
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discrimination by the government. 209 Finally, he rejected Scalia's
conclusion that Rosenberger is distinct in that it involves a limited
public forum, emphasizing the centrality of viewpoint discrimination
in the holding of that case.
210
Finally, Souter emphasized the practical impact that a provision
such as the "decency and respect" clause might have on the artistic
community. Although the majority only upheld the language of the
statute and theoretically allowed artists to preserve their rights by
challenging the provision "as-applied," the dissent noted that, given
the nature of the NEA's decision-making process, such an
opportunity provided little protection for artists' First Amendment
rights:
The NEA does not offer a list of reasons when it
denies a grant application, and an artist or exhibitor
whose subject raises a hint of controversy can never
know for sure whether the decency and respect criteria
played a.1 art in any decision by the NEA to deny
funding.
Souter also stressed the coercive potential for such a provision, as
artists will chill their expression if there is a chance, however small,
that a work may be considered controversial and thus be deprived of
federal funds. "To whatever extent NEA eligibility defines a national
mainstream, the proviso will tend to create a timid esthetic." 212
Mirroring the sentiment in Bella Lewitzky, Souter noted that if such a
provision is upheld, the NEA would serve in a practical manner to
suppress rather than encourage free artistic expression.
213
3. The Consequences of the Court's Decision
The majority opinion represented an uneasy and occasionally
209. Id. at 614-15.
210. "Like this case, Rosenberger involved viewpoint discrimination, and we
have made it clear that such discrimination is impermissible in all forums, even
nonpublic ones .... Accordingly, Rosenberger's brief allusion to forum analysis
was in no way determinative." Id. at 615 n.10.
211. Id. at 617.
212. Id. at 621.
213. Id. at 621-23.
contradictory attempt to reconcile both sides of the conflict. Instead
of choosing between the stark alternatives offered by Scalia and
Souter, either allowing the government to ignore the First
Amendment in the patronage context or forbidding the government
from imposing any viewpoint-based limitations on subsidies and
potentially dooming the NEA in the hands of a hostile Congress, the
Court instead chose to uphold the "compromise" legislation while
giving the NEA enormous discretion in applying it.
214
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Finley used an
implausible doctrinal structure to retreat, at least in
part, from an explicitly institution-specific approach to
determining which governmental institutions can
employ which kinds of content-based, and indeed
viewpoint-based, criteria.., this absence of a
categorical effect played a large part in saving what
would otherwise have been an unconstitutional
standard.2
15
The rationale offered by the majority tiptoed around the fundamental
question of how much an agency such as the NEA may regulate
artistic expression. By robbing the statute of much potential meaning
and focusing on the limited effect of a provision that was not strictly
exclusionary, the Court was able to reach a decision that "blessed the
214. One commentator criticized the "practical approach" of the
Court in Finley:
Finley is an example of 'decisional minimalism' . . . it
assiduously avoids bold doctrinal or theoretical pronouncements.
Similarly, like many minimalistic opinions, its internal
contradictions suggest that it was the product of severe
disagreement within the Court regarding the appropriate
rationale. In Finley, where the Court found itself probably facing
some internal disagreement as well as wrestling with a politically
controversial issue already largely resolved by other branches of
the Government, the Court ... resolved the case with a narrow
and shallow opinion.
Lackland Bloom, Jr., NEA v. Finley: A Decision in Search of a Rationale, 77
WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 25-26 (1999).
215. Schauer, supra note 102, at 94.
Fall 2004 Agencies and the Arts
306 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 24-2
solution" 216 brought forth by the Congressional compromise and
protected the agency from further Congressional disapproval while
ensuring that intrusions on speech were minimal.217
Although the majority's reasoning may be disappointing and even
a bit illogical from a theoretical perspective, the decision itself
appears to further a more realistic policy regarding the NEA or any
agency that is charged with supporting expressive activity. Scalia's
conclusion that any restriction on funding for expressive activity may
be permissible may shield the NEA from Congressional hostility, but
it would also permit the government to impose more far-reaching
requirements on funding, seriously weakening the integrity of an
organization that is supposed to promote artistic expression rather
than the values of the status quo. Likewise, while Souter's refusal to
allow the government to impose any content-based funding
restrictions appears the most compatible with First Amendment
guarantees, it ignores the political ramifications of such a decision. If
Congress, frustrated that the NEA may use federal money to fund
"distasteful" art, was stripped of any control over the agency's
decisions, it would be loath to give any support at all to the NEA.
Thus, the majority's pragmatic decision validates the NEA's
basic mission while allowing it to continue as a politically viable
institution. Such an approach ensures that revered cultural
institutions 218 and arts outreach programs will not lose public supportin the face of a widespread political attack on the more "outrageous"
216. Bloom, supra note 214, at 50.
217. However, the Court's rule should not be overstated:
While the Court may have validated this political compromise, it
does not deserve credit for saving the NEA as such. The NEA
apparently had weathered the political storm, and it is unlikely
that a judicial invalidation of the decency and respect clause
would have led to a serious assault on its continued existence...
Even in the absence of any congressional limitation, the NEA
would be unlikely to deliberately approve grants that might
plunge it back into the political turmoil from which it had only
recently escaped.
Id. at 24.
218. These institutions include 2004 grantees such as the Alvin Ailey Dance
Foundation, Chicago's Joffrey Ballet, New York's Museum of Modem Art and
Metropolitan Museum of Art, Carnegie Hall, the Los Angeles Philharmonic, and
the Mark Taper Forum. A complete list of grantees is available at
http://www.nea.gov/grants/recent/04grants/Creativity.html.
works that had clouded the public's image of the NEA during the
1990's. Although it may be argued that the private sector should be
counted on to support such "worthy" art, the addition of federal
support ensures that there is a degree of stability in, the art world.
While private parties may provide support for the arts in a major
metropolis, programs bringing art and culture to local communities
would be unlikely to survive without the aid of the NEA.21 9
Moreover, private donors may condition their support more freely
than the federal government, creating further conflicts. For example,
Philip Morris threatened to eliminate its arts funding in New York
220City if smoking restrictions were enacted.
However, despite the virtues of the majority's decision, it is
nonetheless difficult to apply. The Court, in failing to establish a
"bright line rule," made it difficult to determine when an agency's
221decision violated artists' constitutional rights. Moreover, insofar
as the Finley Court gave its "blessing" to an admittedly vague
statutory requirement, it may be considered as precedent to support
vague requirements in similar circumstances. 222 Finally, because the
Court justified its decision by minimizing the strength of the
provision rather than acknowledging the balance of interests
involved, it ultimately did little to delineate the breadth of the
government's, agency's, or artist's interests.
IV. CONCLUSION - THE "HARD WON WISDOM" OF THE NEA
Rather than being conclusive, Finley leaves many questions
unanswered, and its broad grant of discretion to the NEA obscures
the extent to which the agency may have duties to protect the First
Amendment rights of grantees while maintaining taxpayers'
confidence in the institution. One way to begin answering this
question is to understand what the NEA's mandate was as well as the
way in which it has evolved.
Since becoming embroiled in the "culture wars" of the 1980s and
219. Flores, supra note 115, at 310.
220. Karen Finley, The Art of Offending, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1996.
221. See Robert Vosburgh, Government Subsidies of Controversial Art: Dung,
the Virgin Mary, and Rudy Giuliani, 11 TEMP. POL. & CIv. RTS. L. REV. 221, 234
(2001).
222. See PETA, 105 F. Supp. 2d at 321.
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1990s, the NEA has changed its focus somewhat, emphasizing the
need to win the confidence of taxpayers 223 and reach out to American
communities as well as the need to encourage artistic excellence.
The NEA has consciously attempted to make the NEA less "elitist,"
perhaps most notably by including six members of Congress in
nonvoting positions on the National Council of Arts. 4 Likewise,
although provisions such as the "decency and respect" clause
imposed few real restraints on the discretion of the agency, the NEA
has become more conservative in its allocation of funds. "It became
apparent that the NEA had internalized the lessons of the
Mapplethorpe and Serrano controversies and had decided to attempt
to steer clear of obviously controversial grants to the extent
possible. 225
This shift is reflected in the official statements of the NEA.
During his tenure as chairman, William Ivey noted that the NEA had
to make the case that art held something of value for the average
American. "The day of being able to increase funding for the
nonprofit arts simply by talking lofty platitudes about the value of art
for citizens - that it's good for you, that it elevates the soul - are
over.'226 The current Chairman, Dana Gioia, has likewise shunned
"elitism" and focused on outreach as an essential component of the
NEA's leadership role. Gioia's vision for the agency involves
convincing the public of the validity of federal arts funding and
emphasizing outreach and education programs that bring established
art to communities 227 rather than innovation. "In order to gain the
necessary support at the federal, state, and local levels, this new
consensus must be positive, inclusive, democratic, and non-divisive
rather than confrontational, partisan, polarizing, and elitist." 228
The attempt to allocate funds in a publicly acceptable manner has
led to a greater degree of public support for the agency. The NEA
223. This modified purpose was codified in 20 U.S.C. § 951(5) (2004).
224. Marika Clark, Second Year of NEA's New Grant Structure a Battle,
DANCE MAGAZINE, May 1998.
225. Bloom, supra note 214, at 24.
226. William Ivey, quoted in Robin Pogrebin, Inheriting Uneasy Truce
Between Art and Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2001.
227. Shakespeare in American Communities, PBS Great Performances, and
the new Rimrock Opera company of Billings, Montana are examples cited in
Gioia's speech. Gioia, supra note 2.
228. Id.
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has gradually recovered from massive cuts during the 1990s,
although funding is still short of the $171 million that the agency
received in 1992,2 29 and is dwarfed by arts funds outside of the
United States, such as the $330 million arts budget for Berlin230 and
funding for Italian opera houses that is "nearly ten times the size of
the annual NEA working budget." 23' This growing acceptance may
be problematic, as arts agencies are increasingly encouraged to
neglect innovation in favor of mainstream and classical artwork.232
However, the "anti-elitist" approach is almost necessary to promote
the NEA's mandate of making art and culture available to more
Americans, as reaching out must require a degree of support, both in
terms of finances and public appreciation of the artist's mission.
Perhaps inevitably, the stated aim of the NEA to create a broad
and dynamic program for supporting the arts is in conflict with this
secondary goal, and thus the NEA and related agencies must balance
these values in making funding decisions. In determining how much
of a "concession" to public taste is acceptable, these agencies are
faced with the difficult task of maintaining their integrity while
retaining an appearance of legitimacy. It may be difficult, if not
impossible, to make decisions in order to inspire "taxpayer
confidence" without facing some danger of creating the "timid
esthetic" warned of by Justice Souter. However, such a contradiction
does not necessarily mean that the NEA and its fellow arts agencies
are invalid. Arts agencies, which are composed largely of arts
229. Arty Party: Have Republicans Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the
NEA ? Not Quite., Mother Jones, Jan. 2004.
230. Id.
231. Gioia, supra note 2.
232. Although President Bush has increased support for the arts, this support
has been largely directed at promoting works and institutions that are established
and uncontroversial:
So while appearing to be more open to the creative side of life,
Bush at the same time makes it clear that the money will mostly
go towards canonical, classic American art and not be used to
fund new, modem, creative, experimental and potentially
controversial endeavors. Just as Bush administration 'sex
education' money is really used for 'abstinence education', his
arts funding is tied to similar political restrictions that aim to
define 'good' art.
Arty Party, supra note 230.
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experts and given a broad mandate to define and support "art," which
is itself a contradictory, ambiguous, and malleable concept, may be
instrumental in shaping the debate about what art is or should be.233
Thus, a large part of these agencies' mission is to act as arbiters
between competing evaluations of art and artistic value, and such an
analysis may justifiably include balancing the ideals of innovation
and outreach to a larger public.
233. It may be noted that art does not exist in a vacuum; consequently,
agencies such as the NEA will inevitably wield control over how art is defined and
understood:
Art, under at least one view, may be defined in terms of the
institutions that create, support, and evaluate it, and because
artistic quality may consequently exist as an institution-
dependent idea, the constitutional permissibility of content and
viewpoint control in arts funding . . . might depend on the
involvement of the institutions of art in the decision under attack.
Schauer, supra note 102, at 115.
